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Abstract. This article analyzes a statement ascribed to the United Nations aid coordinator for North 
Korea to suggest research pursuits in the area of political cognition. 
 
There has been considerable controversy concerning various food aid programs to North Korea. 
Opponents of food cite the North Korean launching of a rocket over Japan, involvement in the 
proliferation of technology that can be used for weapons of mass destruction, aggressive designs on 
South Korea, very hostile propaganda against the United States and its allies throughout the world, 
engagement in espionage operations primarily throughout Asia, and implementation of terrorist 
operations as rationales for minimizing or preventing aid. They posit that aid should not be given to such 
a political actor and that the possibility of aid should be used as an incentive--something to be delivered 
only when the above behaviors cease. 
 
On the other hand, supporters of aid to North Korea advocate that such aid will create "good will" or 
otherwise induce North Korea to temper its behavior and change its character. While opponents of aid 
seem to be (often unknowingly) basing their rationale on common principles of operant conditioning--
viz., that a positive reinforcer following a desired (from the conditioner's perspective) behavior is most 
likely to increase the probability that such a behavior will occur again--supporters seem to be banking on 
a less common principle such as "backward conditioning" or, perhaps, the same principle as opponents 
with the proviso that some other behavior--e.g., an inferred intrapsychic cognitive or emotional process-
-antecedes the positive reinforcer. 
 
The above is just an illustration of the complexity and mystery of delineating the psychological 
substrate(s) of an individual's arrival at and evaluation of a specific policy. As another illustration, 
consider a statement ascribed to the United Nations aid coordinator for North Korea. This individual has 
taken Issue with opponents who contend that much of the food aid to North Korea is being diverted 
from the people who seem to be in the direst nutritional need to members of the political and military 
elites. His stated rationale is that the elites prefer rice to the corn and wheat from the aid program and 
that national supplies meet their needs. However the fungibility of food in conditions of dire necessity 
suggest that (1) even rice lovers will eat corn and wheat if there is little rice and (2) corn and wheat aid 
increases the probability that rice will be available more of the time to the elite. Neither of these two 
suggestions is necessarily an effective counter to the views of aid opponents. 
 
The seeming logic of policy rationale often suffers upon close scrutiny. That is why the area of political 
cognition--especially approaches bearing on complexes and sequences of cognition, motivation, 
emotion, and behavior--is such a potentially fruitful one for political psychologists who seek to inform 
the political world. (See Denniston, J. C., Miller, R. R., & Matute, H. (1996). Biological significance as 
determinant of cue competition. Psychological Science, 7, 325-331; Durrheim, K. (199 7). Theoretical 
conundrum: The politics and science of theorizing authoritarian cognition. Political Psychology, 18, 625-
647; Eckholm, E. (April 3, 1999). North Korea's food near end, aid workers say. The New York Times, p. 
A3; Miller, R. R., & Matute, H. Biological significance in forward and backward blocking: Resolution of a 
discrepancy between animal conditioning and human causal judgment. Journal of Experimental 
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Psychology: General, 125, 370-386; Way, B.M., & Masters, R.D. (1996). Political attitudes: Interactions of 
cognition and affect. Motivation and Emotion, 20, 205-236.) (Keywords: Aid, Fungibility, North Korea, 
Political Cognition.) 
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